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Innovative Organizing Practices:
ACORN’s Campaign in Los Angeles
Organizing Workfare Workers
Fred Brooks, PhD
ABSTRACT. The work requirements in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) set the stage for
unprecedented expansion of workfare programs across the nation.
Shortly after the PRWORA passed, the Los Angeles chapter of the Asso-
ciation of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) began
a union-style organizing drive of the 25,000 General Relief (GR) recipi-
ents in Los Angeles County’s workfare program. Over the past four
years the de facto union, in coalition with over 75 allied community, la-
bor, and clergy organizations, won numerous substantive progressive
policy changes in the workfare program. In a case study format, this paper
describes the following innovative organizing practices and how they con-
tributed to the workfare policy changes: (a) combining labor and commu-
nity organizing strategies, (b) combining conflict tactics with direct
service, and (c) developing leadership from the General Relief constitu-
ency. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery
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INTRODUCTION
Though the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) is couched as welfare reform, there is nothing new about
using welfare policy to reinforce the work ethic. Since the dawn of capi-
talism over 600 years ago, Western governments have consistently dis-
couraged welfare and encouraged work for the able-bodied poor
(Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997). Requiring able-bodied welfare recipients
to work for their benefits, now called workfare, has been a recurring
theme in the various efforts to reform welfare in the USA over the past 30
years. The major facets of PRWORA–time limits, work requirements,
and the end of entitlement status for cash assistance–seem new only be-
cause they are the most radical changes in U.S. welfare policy over the
past 60 years (see Bane, 1997; Edelman, 1997; Hagen, 1998).
Some American states began requiring certain welfare recipients to
work in exchange for their benefits in the 1940s (Mink, 1998). Since the
1960s, the federal government implemented three major versions of
welfare reform prior to PRWORA. The Work Incentive (WIN) program
passed in 1967 (Gueron, 1989) and was further reformed into WIN II in
1971 (Rose, 1995). In 1988 congress passed yet another version of wel-
fare to work called the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Act (JOBS).
Although all three programs were heralded as dramatic change in the di-
rection of work, the highest percent of the total AFDC caseload ever put
to work under any of the programs was approximately 13% (Handler &
Hasenfeld, 1997). By contrast, PRWORA required states to have 25%
of the caseload employed in 1997, and 50% in work activities by 2002.
Any state failing to meet the quota for recipients working would have
their TANF block grant cut significantly. PRWORA set the stage for the
largest expansion of workfare in modern history.
Shortly after PRWORA passed in 1996, the Association of Commu-
nity Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a national grassroots
citizens organization, decided to get ahead of the curve on the possible
expansion of workfare by organizing workfare workers in Los Angeles
and New York City, two cities that already had expansive workfare pro-
grams. In Los Angeles, able bodied recipients of General Relief (GR)
have been required to work for their $221 monthly check since 1948
(Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services, 2000a).
Workfare has existed for decades in New York also, but was greatly ex-
panded in 1994 as the centerpiece of Mayor Giuliani’s welfare policy
(Dulchin, 1999). ACORN’s strategy was to build large, militant, de
facto unions of workfare workers in Los Angeles and New York during
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the first two years of PRWORA, so that by the time the escalating work
quotas in PRWORA forced other states to implement workfare,
ACORN’s successes in New York and Los Angeles might at best, blunt
the spread of workfare nationwide, or at least allow ACORN to orga-
nize workfare campaigns quickly and effectively in other cities where it
has organizing operations. Accordingly, over the past five years
ACORN has mobilized over 25,000 welfare recipients in Los Angeles
and New York City to challenge various aspects of workfare.
This paper presents a case study of Los Angeles ACORN’s four-year
campaign organizing workfare workers and highlights several aspects
of the campaign. First, ACORN blended both labor and community or-
ganizing strategies to build a permanent organization, called Workfare
Workers Organizing Committee or WWOC/ACORN, that fought and
won–through a combination of disruptive protests, coalition building,
and negotiations–numerous substantive improvements in both
workfare and welfare policies. Second, what was considered an inter-
mediate victory–the Case Complaint System (CCS)–has evolved into a
permanent, full-time operation, staffed by two former General Relief
recipients. The CCS takes and resolves an average of 200 calls per
month from GR or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
clients claiming problems with their cases. The Case Complaint System
is an innovative conflict style community organization providing a di-
rect social service to individual constituents. The third innovative prac-
tice is the democratic structure of WWOC/ACORN, which has
contributed to profound social, psychological, and political transforma-
tion experienced by many WWOC members. Leadership development
from the GR constituency has been so successful that today members
who are now on staff do most of the building and maintaining of the or-
ganization. The democratic, membership-run structure of WWOC ap-
pears to be a primary vehicle for empowering this constituency both
personally and politically. After briefly noting historical and other cur-
rent organizing responses to workfare, this paper describes methods,
background of the problem, the evolution of WWOC/ACORN, keys to
success, current status, difficulties encountered and lessons learned
from the organizing.
HISTORICAL AND OTHER RESPONSES TO WORKFARE
The largest attempt to organize welfare recipients in the USA since
1935 was the effort by the National Welfare Rights Organization
Fred Brooks 67
(NWRO) in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although federal workfare was
introduced with the WIN legislation in 1967, there were so many ex-
emptions available to recipients only a small minority of recipients
were enrolled in the program (Rose, 1995). NWRO attempted (unsuc-
cessfully) to block the adoption of federal work requirements in the
WIN legislation. The political climate was very different in the 1960s
and NWRO focused more on consumption issues like expanded bene-
fits and a guaranteed annual income rather than employment-based is-
sues like workfare (Reese & Newcombe, in press).
Although workfare has been part of particular states’ welfare pro-
grams since the 1940s’ (Mink, 1998), prior to PRWORA, workfare
never affected a majority of welfare recipients nationwide. New York
has had workfare for General Assistance recipients since 1971.
Shortly thereafter workfare workers in New York City began organiz-
ing to challenge it. Once such organization was called the Public
Works Program Organizing Committee (PWPOC). PWPOC viewed
workfare “ . . . as the beginning of a slave market–people without rights,
people working without the hope of meaningful jobs or an adequate in-
come” (Helling & Zerwick, 1982, p. 81-82). PWPOC was concerned
about workfare workers displacing thousands of union-wage full-time
jobs. PWPOC collaborated with District Council 37-American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees (DC-37) to file a peti-
tion with the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining. It asked
that DC-37 represent workfare employees at sites already covered by
bargaining agreements. The suit was dismissed and later taken to New
York State court (Helling & Zerwick, 1982), but PWPOC and DC-37
never prevailed in ending workfare in New York City.
In response to the 1995 expansion of workfare in New York, several
community organizations, legal associations and (once again) DC-37
began organizing workfare workers in distinctly different ways (for a
detailed overview see Krinsky, 1998a, 1998b). In mid-1996, WEP
Workers Together! (WWT!)–a coalition of three low-income citizens
organizations–started organizing workfare workers at job sites to attract
and involve established labor unions and eventually lead the organizing
effort. According to Krinsky (1998a, p. 287), WWT! characterized
work site organizing to be “extremely difficult” and by mid-1997 the
three organizations pursued their own relatively limited strategies. In
June 1997, DC-37 started organizing workfare workers. Most likely
due to fear of losing their access to the Giuliani administration, DC-37
never allocated more than minimal resources to the organizing drive
and never clarified their objectives about organizing workfare workers.
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Unrelated to workfare, DC-37 experienced its own internal troubles and
abandoned its workfare organizing in 1998 (Krinsky, 1998a, 1998b).
In 1997 New York ACORN began organizing workfare workers.
ACORN made workfare a high priority by assigning 17 field organizers
to the effort (Krinsky, 1998b). ACORN met with the other groups that
were organizing workfare workers to minimize inter-organizational
conflict and workfare workers promptly signed over 16,000 union au-
thorization cards. ACORN held an election supervised by a Blue Rib-
bon Commission (albeit unauthorized by the National Labor Relations
Board) in which over 17,000 workfare workers voted to have ACORN
represent them in negotiations with the city over workfare issues.
ACORN’s effort dwarfed the organizing activity sponsored by the
anti-workfare organizations (Krinsky, 1998a). The Giuliani administra-
tion has been recalcitrant toward recognizing the de facto workfare un-
ion, so victories have been difficult. In spite of fierce opposition, New
York ACORN/WWOC won a grievance procedure in addition to nu-
merous improvements of working conditions at workfare sites. The ef-
forts to organize workfare workers in New York is well documented in
prior research (see Dulchin, 1999; Krinsky, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c;
O’Connell, 1999), so this paper focuses on the organizing of workfare
workers in Los Angeles.
METHOD
Data were collected from three different sources. First, Los Angeles
ACORN campaign files were examined. The files contained research
reports, campaign brochures, press releases, articles from newspapers,
meeting agendae, correspondence to and from DPSS, internal memos,
and letters to allies. For a more analytical and experiential point of view,
interviews were conducted with two organizers who have worked on
the campaign since the outset. Individual interviews were also con-
ducted with three female members of WWOC, and six male members
and leaders of WWOC were interviewed using a focus group methodol-
ogy. Interview guides contained open-ended questions like “What is-
sues did you have about workfare that led you to join WWOC?” and
“What has WWOC won?” Interviews were tape recorded, transcribed,
and content analyzed. In the fall of 2000 the author also attended three
WWOC events as a participant observer. The first event was a 30 per-
son direct action targeting a Deputy Director of a local DPSS office on
the issue of slow response time to case complaints phoned in by
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WWOC/ACORN. The second event was a negotiating session between
several senior DPSS administrators and key staff and leaders from
WWOC and several allied organizations. Negotiations centered on eli-
gibility criteria, time limits, and benefits in the relatively new General
Relief Opportunities for Work (GROW) program within GR. The final
event was a WWOC membership meeting designed to create a list of
demands for the chief administrator of GR. The combination of partici-
pant observation, individual/group interviews and secondary analysis
of WWOC files permitted triangulation of data. The Human Subjects
Committee of the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board
approved all research procedures prior to data collection. Earlier drafts
of this paper were reviewed by two ACORN organizers as an accuracy
check on events described in the paper.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Demographics of the GR Caseload
Los Angeles has had a County-administered General Relief program
since 1938. General Relief is the bottom thread of the safety net, provid-
ing $221 dollars a month to indigent adults without dependents who are
ineligible for federal or state cash assistance (Human Services Alliance
of Los Angeles, 2000). Since 1948 GR recipients judged able-bodied
have been required to work for their benefits. During the 90s the GR
caseload ranged from 48,000 to 107,000. Typically, 40% of the case-
load was judged able-bodied by the Watts Mobile Medical Unit and
therefore required to work 40 hours per month in return for their $221
benefit (Human Services Alliance of Los Angeles, 2000). Due to the
high turnover of the GR caseload the demographics can vary consider-
ably every month, but normally the caseload was approximately 60%
male, 40% female, 50% African American, 25% Hispanic, 20% White,
and 5% Asian. The average age of recipients ranged from 40 to 48 years
of age (Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services,
2000b).
ACORN’s Mandate
ACORN has a thirty-year history of organizing low and moderate in-
come citizens into democratically run organizations that use confronta-
tional tactics to win issues such as tenants rights, living wages, lifeline
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utility rates, affordable housing, access to bank loans, and elimination
of predatory lending, among other issues. ACORN’s organizing model
is well documented in the literature (see Delgado, 1986; Fisher, 1987;
Staples, 1984; Stein, 1986; also see www.ACORN.org for current ac-
tivities). Although the majority of ACORN’s work has been organizing
the working poor in low to moderate income neighborhoods, ACORN
evolved in 1970 from the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO). When President Clinton signed PRWORA in 1996 ACORN
felt a mandate to “go back to the future” and once again organize major
campaigns focusing on welfare issues (Rathke & Schur, 1999, p. 1). Af-
ter analyzing PRWORA, ACORN organizers had several concerns.
First, PRWORA was severe exploitation of a large and politically weak
population of low-income citizens. Second, the work requirements in
PRWORA would likely create a large pool of free labor that would dis-
place thousands of full-time jobs (often unionized) at the lower end of
the wage-labor market. Third (as previously described), PRWORA’s
time limits and work requirements might be a blueprint for large-scale
workfare programs all across the nation (Rathke & Schur, 1999).
Beyond the mandate of the organization, interviews with workfare
workers quickly revealed numerous problems from their point of view.
These problems included:
• Workers felt a stigma was attached to workfare. They described
feelings of degradation, exploitation, little respect, and no dignity
emanating from their workfare role.
• Feelings of injustice associated with doing the same work
side-by-side full-time workers, who were often making 2-3 times
as much money compared to workfare workers.
• Although the language of the workfare statute claimed workfare
was supposed to prepare GR recipients for real jobs, participants
felt strongly that workfare operated as an end in itself rather than a
stepping stone to wage-based employment.
• Health and safety issues. In dozens of cases workfare workers
were expected to do the same work as full-time employees, but of-
ten were not given the same training, uniforms, equipment, or
safety precautions.
• The support services DPSS were supposed to provide, such as bus
tokens, and clothing allowances, were often sloppily delivered
making it difficult for the workfare client to maintain a job-like
commitment to his/her workfare assignment (Rathke & Schur,
1999).
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The combination of ACORN’s historical mandate to organize ex-
ploited low income constituencies, the draconian elements of PRWORA,
and the litany of problems experienced by workfare workers made for a
happy marriage of organization, issues, and constituency.
EVOLUTION OF WWOC/ACORN
Recruitment
In late 1996 ACORN organizers began visiting the 500 workfare
sites in Los Angeles County, and using a standard labor organizing
pitch, asking workfare workers about their concerns. Whenever orga-
nizers struck a chord with workers, they asked workers to sign authori-
zation cards allowing WWOC/ACORN to represent them in labor
negotiations with DPSS. Here is how one organizer described the ease
of getting workers to sign authorization cards:
The minute we, as organizers, raised the issue of receiving Equal
Pay for Equal Work, the rest was easy. When people are so clear
that they’re being exploited, they almost organize themselves.
Workers were also invited to the next WWOC meeting or event.
Adapting the ACORN community organizing model, WWOC held 13
planning meetings at work sites to discuss issues, tactics, and targets be-
fore having a large meeting where the members elected officers and de-
cided on a plan of action. Another part of ACORN’s model is to
immediately follow a meeting with an event, thus within a week of the
first meeting 16 WWOC/ACORN members staged an event targeting
workfare supervisors at County General Hospital, demanding that
workfare workers have the same uniforms as regular employees, use of
the same bathrooms, and the same cafeteria discount that regular work-
ers enjoy. Embarrassed by ACORN/WWOC confronting them on these
discriminatory practices, County General Hospital agreed to comply
with all three demands. The quick but significant win solidified mem-
bership commitment and solidarity to the cause (another tenet of com-
munity organizing).
After the first win, the momentum of the campaign really took off.
Organizers report that from the spring of 1997 until December of 1998
WWOC held weekly planning meetings (8-20 members), monthly
membership meetings (50-60 members), and staged direct actions on
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targets every 4-6 weeks (generally drawing 60-80 members, but several
with over 100, and one with 400+ members and allies). One of the lead
organizers, who has over a dozen years of organizing experience,
stated, “This [was] the highest consistent turnout I’ve ever been a part
of, in any organization work I’ve ever done!”
Organizers were aware that turning out the poorest citizens would
take more than just a phone call or a visit, so they offered members bus
tokens and food at organizational events. The Catholic Workers–who
run a soup kitchen on LA’s skid row–provided free box lunches at over
a dozen events during the course of the campaign. As one member
stated, “When you set up a meeting for poor people, make sure to pro-
vide transportation and food. The hungriest people are who you want at
an action.”
The Role of Allies
Although ACORN took the lead organizing WWOC, the organiza-
tion sought allies to support the campaign on several levels. In the cur-
rent political climate that is largely positive toward PRWORA (at least
among political elites and the mass media), ACORN viewed correctly
that it would be difficult to win the moral high ground toward the con-
stituency of able-bodied, mostly male, adults without dependents.
ACORN knew it would take the support of as many allied organizations
as possible, to not only win the moral high ground, but to have any
chance of making major substantive policy changes at DPSS. Accord-
ingly, ACORN solicited the support of clergy, churches, labor unions,
civil rights groups, immigrant rights organizations, community organi-
zations, legal organizations, and even a few liberal Hollywood celebri-
ties such as Ed Asner and Martin Sheen. A total of 41 clergy and
churches endorsed the Workfare Workers Bill of Rights, and 75 allied
organizations signed on their support. In addition to endorsing the cam-
paign with their name the following organizations made substantive
contributions either by assisting with research, legal advocacy,
strategizing, negotiating, speaking at actions and sometimes turn-
ing-out significant numbers of people at events: Los Angeles Coalition
to End Hunger and Homelessness, Public Counsel, Service Employees
International Union Local 660, LA Chapter of National Lawyer’s
Guild, and Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice. Although
WWOC/ACORN spearheaded the campaign and consistently turned
out the majority of workfare recipients at actions, the role of allies was
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critical. ACORN reports that without the support of allies, many of the
victories would not have taken place.
Demands
The initial demands and actions were primarily around health and
safety issues such as proper clothing, gloves, equipment, and training to
perform a job. Organizers reported numerous instances of GR recipi-
ents working in potentially dangerous situations. One worker had an al-
lergic reaction to the gloves provided by her employer, and when she
asked for a different pair, she was told none were available. To make
things worse, when she went to the nurse’s office to seek treatment, she
was told she couldn’t be treated because she wasn’t on staff (Rivera,
1997). Another GR worker assigned to do janitorial work at County-USC
Medical Center said that regular workers were given better gloves and
were trained in how to mix chemical cleansers. Without proper gloves or
training she reported getting headaches and dizziness every time she tried
to mix the cleansers (Rivera, 1997). Although initial demands were
around improved health and safety issues for workers, over the first year
of organizing a comprehensive list of demands emerged from WWOC
membership meetings. These demands included:
• Equal treatment between workfare workers and regular workers,
including the extension of workers rights and protective labor leg-
islation to cover workfare workers as well as pay equity between
workfare workers and regular county workers.
• Workfare programs should better prepare participants to obtain a
decent job.
• The county should improve workfare participants’ access to goods
and services that enable them to work. Workfare workers should
have access to childcare, transportation, and clothing that allow
them to complete their workfare assignments.
• Public and private employers should adopt a First Source hiring
policy and to use Los Angles ACORN as a union hiring hall in or-
der to recruit new workers. The First Source hiring policy gives
qualified workfare workers the first chance to apply and interview
for new county jobs.
• The county should address its job shortage by creating more public
sectors, permanent jobs that would pay a living wage and provide
benefits (above demands from Rathke & Schur, 1999, p. 4).
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• In 1998 DPSS was preparing to move thousands of TANF recipi-
ents into workfare. In a major campaign called “Everyone Who
Works Deserves a Paycheck,” WWOC/ACORN demanded the
County implement a wage-based program for TANF recipients
rather than dramatically expand workfare.
Over the course of the four-year campaign different demands were
emphasized at different points in time, appropriate to the members’ in-
terests, the target, DPSS policy, and political opportunities, all of which
shifted and changed over time.
Targets
The bureaucratic, political, multi-layered organization of workfare
combined with the murky legal status of workfare itself, encouraged
WWOC/ACORN to progress against multiple targets. Initial targets in-
cluded several “employers” at workfare sites such as USC-County Hos-
pital that regularly used 800 workfare workers. The demands on
workfare sites included hiring workfare participants for real jobs rather
than workfare and improved health and safety precautions for partici-
pants. Several private employers with large county contracts were also
targeted on the issue of hiring workfare workers for wage-based jobs.
DPSS was a primary target throughout the campaign. WWOC tar-
geted local DPSS offices on issues related to case complaints. The per-
sonal target for local actions would be the Director of the local DPSS
office. For substantive policy changes the governing power structure of
DPSS was targeted, including the Director of the Workfare Division
and the Director of LA County DPSS. As is often the case when pres-
sured by citizens’ organizations, the targets at all levels of DPSS were
quick to deny they had the power to address WWOC’s demands, and
many tried to pass the buck to a higher level of authority. For example,
the Director of General Relief for DPSS claimed her ability to change
the time limits for GR was limited by mandates from her boss, the LA
Board of Supervisors. The Board of Supervisors became the ultimate,
and as it turned out, the most intransigent target in the campaign. The
Supervisors are elected by district and are the final governing authority
in Los Angeles County, controlling DPSS budgets, appointment of di-
rectors, and setting overall priorities for DPSS. WWOC challenged the
Board of Supervisors only after the broad coalition was in place, and af-
ter it had already targeted many actions on DPSS itself.
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Tactics and Strategy
A major innovation of the campaign was to blend tactics from both
labor and community organizing traditions. The labor tactic of visiting
work sites to recruit members who then sign authorization cards has al-
ready been discussed. Since WWOC was a de facto union with little
chance of National Labor Relations Board recognition, the entire cam-
paign was built in the streets using a community organizing protocol.
WWOC/ACORN created a cycle of planning meetings, large member-
ship meetings, quickly followed by direct actions on targets making
specific demands appropriate to the target. Members were de-briefed
after actions always with a positive spin and a look to the future.
WWOC leveraged smaller victories, like winning equal access to bath-
rooms or new uniforms, into larger victories such as the grievance pro-
cedure while enlisting the support of allied organizations.
With a constituency as politically marginal as workfare workers, it
was clear that to attract the attention of DPSS and the Board of Supervi-
sors, disruptive tactics would be required. Planning and membership
meetings aimed to agree on the protocol for an event. The action check-
list included the following: plan an event, encourage a targeted number
of members to attend; select a target that would be accessible and would
have the authority to meet the demands; create a list of demands and se-
lect member spokespersons to deliver it; plan tactics to enter the build-
ing, office, or work site; rehearse chants and songs to build solidarity,
make it fun, and disturb business as usual at the site; make banners,
signs, and flyers to catch attention and provide photo-ops for the press;
write a press release and select member spokespersons to meet the
press; and plan to hand out bus tokens, de-brief the members, and lunch.
Many of the actions included street theater and props that would de-
liver the message symbolically and humorously. At one event, over 100
WWOC members turned in 10,000 signed union authorization cards to
DPSS and erected a huge canopy tent emblazoned with “GR Union
Hiring Hall Open for Business.” Members began turning in job applica-
tions. Another action, staged in front of the LA Board of Supervisors
building in December 1999, featured a member dressed up as the Grinch
Who Stole My Labor. The Grinch had “LA County” written on her back
and she danced around a circle of GR recipients and would steal their
hand-held cards saying DIGNITY, RESPECT, SELF-ESTEEM, WORK
HISTORY, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, and PAYCHECK. This
action pressured the Board of Supervisors to implement a wage-based
program for TANF mothers required to work rather than making them
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enter workfare. The symbolic representation of the degradation of
workfare was fun for the members, poignant, and garnered great press
coverage.
The cumulative impact of over 30 direct actions won WWOC/ACORN a
seat at the table for dozens of negotiating sessions to improve conditions and
change policy. For example, when DPSS finally agreed to offer workfare
workers a grievance procedure, it took eight negotiating sessions to finalize
the details. WWOC member leaders gave members a direct voice in the type
of policy finally agreed upon, and always attended negotiating sessions. In-
volving members in all key facets of the business is part of ACORN’s orga-
nizing model, and plays a key role in leadership development.
Victories
Using the strategies and tactics just described WWOC/ACORN won
the following substantive changes in workfare/GR policies:
• A Grievance Procedure for Workfare workers, considered the first
such policy in the nation.
• A DPSS issued brochure that spells out the rights (including the
grievance procedure) and responsibilities of workfare workers,
that all workfare workers receive upon admission to the program.
The pamphlet has ACORN’s name and phone number (along with
two other agencies) and suggests workers contact ACORN if they
have questions or concerns about workfare.
• Improved health and safety regulations at work sites. WWOC/
ACORN won backbraces for workers doing heavy lifting at the
County Museum of Natural History and shovels for beach workers
who often found snakes under seaweed clumps that were previously
lifted by hand.
• More equitable treatment of workfare workers at many job sites.
For example, at the USC-County hospital WWOC/ACORN won
uniforms and cafeteria discounts for workfare workers.
• Implementation of priority hiring lists by private and public em-
ployers. This program encouraged workfare workers to take the
civil service exam. GR recipients who pass are put on a prior-
ity-hiring list used by county employers. The county also for the
first time ever created a special registry for GR workers designed
to fill County clerical jobs.
• Several private companies that receive government contracts
agreed to put workfare workers on a priority-hiring list. For exam-
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ple, Lockheed Martin Information Management Systems agreed
to post any entry-level job openings through WWOC/ACORN’s
Community Hiring Hall five days before making any other post-
ings.
• In conjunction with other welfare recipients and welfare advo-
cates, WWOC/ACORN helped persuade the County Board of Su-
pervisors to restore benefits for GR recipients to nine months after
they had cut benefits from year-round to only six months of eligi-
bility per year.
• In 1998 the GR Workfare program was overhauled to a new pro-
gram called GROW. GROW is operated more like TANF wel-
fare-to-work programs and includes job search assistance with
education, training and/or workfare. Thanks to pressure applied by
WWOC/ACORN and its allies, DPSS agreed to make workfare a
voluntary rather than mandatory activity in the GROW program.
Although most GR recipients are required to perform workfare to
receive food stamps, the new policy greatly reduces the number of
hours recipients are forced to work (Rathke & Schur, 1999).
• And perhaps the most significant pro-active victory in the cam-
paign–in the fall of 2000 California Governor Gray Davis gave
counties the local option to establish wage-based programs rather
than workfare for TANF recipients. At the time of this writing
(Spring 2001), was the Board of Supervisors reviewing
wage-based options for TANF recipients in Los Angeles County.
Keys to Success
Organizers and members attribute the keys to success in the
four-year campaign to the collective impact of the following: (1) The
depth and breadth of the membership. Turning in over 10,000 signed
authorization cards and actively involving hundreds of workfare work-
ers monthly clarified that WWOC/ACORN represented a majority of
workfare workers. (2) Winning the moral high ground. The involve-
ment of a large, diverse, committed and active group of allies was cru-
cial here. (3) Persistence. In various ways WWOC/ACORN kept
significant pressure on targets for over four years through hard-hitting
actions that often took DPSS by surprise and put it on the defensive.
(4) The combination of labor and community organizing tactics.
Sticking exclusively to either labor or community tactics would have
made it difficult to deliver big wins. Again, the labor model was critical
to recruitment and, the CO protocol was required for campaign and ac-
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tion strategies, and offering direct services like the Case Complaint Sys-
tem.
In terms of the overall strategy, the most brilliant strategic decision
was to take a position in favor of work and exploit it for maximum ef-
fect. None of the demands said “We do not want to work.” One of Saul
Alinsky’s (1971, p. 128) cardinal rules of tactics was “make the enemy
live up to their own book of rules.” If the true intent of workfare was to
promote work, then workfare workers should have real jobs, with
wages and all the benefits and rights normal employees have.
WWOC/ACORN did a masterful job of pressuring DPSS and the Board
of Supervisors to live up to their own book of rules and create policies
that would support real jobs for workfare workers. At the same time, it
was crucial to highlight all the ways workfare was not real work and
was not leading to real jobs. Through fact sheets, testimonials, and sym-
bolism WWOC successfully painted workfare as “slave labor” and pre-
sented wage-based labor as “the promised land.” One indicator of the
success of this tactic was winning a positive endorsement from the Los
Angeles Times (1999) Editorial Board for making the TANF wel-
fare-to-work program wage-based rather than workfare. In the end the
success of making DPSS and the Board of Supervisors live up to their
own rules was probably the most critical factor to the success of the
campaign.
Case Complaint System
Traditionally conflict-style community organizations fought hard to
win reforms and policy changes but left implementation of those
changes to more mainstream social service agencies. Over the years
ACORN began to see the advantages of first winning a reform and then
providing the service. Benefits included additional resources to hire
staff and pay for office space. ACORN would typically attach its name
to the service providing valuable, no-cost, social marketing of the orga-
nization. Also, providing direct services often became a recruitment
tool to build the organization. For these reasons it has become a com-
mon ACORN organizing practice to provide direct services after win-
ning a major policy reform. An example of providing direct services
after winning policy reforms through direct action is the mortgage loan
counseling ACORN offers to low income families in 28 cities across the
country. For most of its 30 years ACORN has fought bank redlining,
and pushed for improved financial services in low-income neighbor-
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hoods. Rather than have someone else provide the services, ACORN
decided to run its own loan counseling operations.
The Case Complaint System is another direct service fulfilling these
functions for Los Angeles ACORN. Presently, when individuals qual-
ify for GR or TANF, DPSS gives them a brochure outlining their rights
and responsibilities. The brochure has the names and phone numbers of
ACORN and two other organizations recipients can call if they have
problems or need help negotiating the welfare bureaucracy. Since Feb-
ruary 1998 the primary staff person assigned to take case complaints is a
former GR recipient who started out as a WWOC member. After a year,
her knowledge and expertise of the system warranted hiring her to solve
case complaints. ACORN hired another WWOC member to help with
the 175-200 calls per month. The case complaint workers are currently
being trained as organizers to take on an even larger role in the mainte-
nance of WWOC/ACORN.
Several features make the case complaint system an innovative prac-
tice. First, ACORN negotiated an agreement with DPSS that a special
liaison will take the calls from ACORN and will respond to the com-
plaint within four hours. Since ACORN takes calls everyday from 9:00
to 1:30, the majority of complaints are resolved in the same day. In an
era where one of the biggest gripes welfare recipients have about the
system is the inability to talk to their caseworker, same-day turnaround
on case complaints is a paradigm of efficiency.
Secondly, case complaints are reported to DPSS in a professional,
problem-solving manner, different from the boisterous, aggressive
tenor of some of the direct actions. This is helpful because it allows
DPSS to see WWOC/ACORN as not just a “bunch of rabble-rousers”
but also capable of operating as diplomatic, professional problem-solv-
ers. Providing the direct service counters the argument by DPSS that
ACORN is exploiting workfare for political gain rather than actively
trying to help GR recipients (although targets tried to make that argu-
ment; see Rivera, 1997). At the same time, the fact that ACORN is al-
ways capable of taking an issue to the streets and disrupting business as
usual in an office, constantly reminds the liaisons assigned to resolve
the complaints phoned-in by ACORN. In sum, the combination of the
Case Complaint System with ACORN’s direct actions offers a one-two
punch toward meeting the needs of the welfare constituency. Symbi-
otically each system nourishes the other.
The member/organizers who staff the case complaint system also be-
lieve they offer a superior referral service compared to DPSS casework-
ers. The present methodology has no way to confirm this assertion, but
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the peer advocacy aspect of the system lends some credibility to the no-
tion. The peer advocates offering referrals through the CCS have first-
hand experience with the problems recipients are facing and many of
the food banks, homeless shelters, legal agencies, medical centers, etc.,
to which they refer clients.
Taking case complaints for three years has allowed the organization
to provide a valuable direct service to over 6,000 GR/TANF clients. Al-
though they do not track the number of active members recruited
through case complaints, organizers estimate the system generates sev-
eral hundred active members a year for WWOC/ACORN. It may seem
like a small service, but if you have no money or food, and ACORN re-
turns your food stamps the same day you call, as one member explained,
“ . . . it is a life and death issue.”
Democratic Structure and Leadership Development
From the membership perspective, WWOC/ACORN is one of the
few organizations in Los Angeles that empowers low-income citizens
to act collectively on their own behalf. One member stated:
Before I joined ACORN I found out this town is full of organiza-
tions of professionals organized to help poor people. But
ACORN’s the first place where actual poor people can come in
and learn how to help themselves.
The democratic structure built into ACORN’s organizing model de-
mands that members participate in all activities and decisions made by
and for the organization. In practice this means staff do not advocate on
behalf of members, but organize members to advocate on their own be-
half. Examples of the democratic structure in the organizing model in-
clude: members run their own meetings, elect their own leadership, have
their own board that controls the organization and to whom the organiz-
ers are accountable; members lead the events and are spokespersons for
the press, and as much as possible members engage in research, recruit-
ment, fundraising and other maintenance tasks for the organization.
Leadership development is both a by-product of the democratic struc-
ture of the organization and is also consciously cultivated in members
via special leadership training workshops and events. Leadership devel-
ops naturally among members by speaking at meetings, chairing a
meeting, helping plan an event, speaking at an event, being interviewed
Fred Brooks 81
for the local news, or by participating in negotiations with public offi-
cials.
Leadership development was a critical part of WWOC’s workfare
campaign. During the peak 18 months of the campaign WWOC held
Leadership Training workshops every other Saturday from 9 to noon.
At these sessions members would learn how to chair a meeting, keys to
effective negotiating, leading songs and chants, the broader political
context of GR and welfare, and the political power structure of LA and
the Board of Supervisors among other things. Leadership development
has been so successful at WWOC four members have migrated to the
professional organizing staff. Another former WWOC member joined
the organizing staff and has since been hired by an established union as
a labor organizer.
Leadership development is not a one-way street that only benefits the
organization. Interviews with both members and staff revealed that
many WWOC members experience significant positive personal trans-
formation as a result of their involvement in the organization. Several
members stated that before their involvement in ACORN they would
feel nervous, hesitant, or intimidated talking to a “suit and tie” profes-
sional about their welfare case. But the experience of leading meetings,
presenting demands at actions, talking to the press, etc., has boosted
their self-confidence, self-esteem, public speaking skills, assertiveness,
and overall sense of purpose. The dual process of empowering workfare
workers both politically and personally appears to be an innovative ex-
ample of empowerment practice.
CURRENT STATUS
At the end of 2000 WWOC/ACORN was four years old. In 1998
DPSS overhauled the workfare program for GR recipients into a new
program called GROW, which emphasizes job search, training and edu-
cation rather than simply workfare. Although this may seem like a huge
victory, WWOC/ACORN members are critical of GROW. Today,
WWOC/ACORN remains active on issues around the implementation
of GROW. Over the last two years WWOC/ACORN began recruiting
TANF recipients in addition to GR recipients. Both types of welfare re-
cipients plus allies joined forces on a campaign called “Everyone Who
Works Deserves a Paycheck.” The goal of the campaign was to push
DPSS and the Board of Supervisors to implement a wage-based work
plan for TANF mothers who are not employed when their two-year time
82 JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY PRACTICE
limit expires. At the time of this writing, the county appeared on the
verge of implementing a wage-based program for TANF recipients and
had asked for ACORN’s input in negotiating the details of how the pro-
gram will work. If the county follows through, organizers feel a
wage-based program for TANF recipients will be the most significant
victory in four years of organizing around workfare.
CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
All things considered, ACORN organizers found the GR workfare
constituency ripe and easy to organize. The workers felt exploited and
were quick to join a de facto union taking direct action to improve their
working conditions and fight for GR policy changes. Organizers found
that providing bus tokens and free lunches produced large turn-outs for
events. Offering the direct service of resolving individual case com-
plaints helped recruit members and build credibility and solidarity
among GR recipients. The democratic structure of WWOC allowed
members to run the organization and feel empowered both politically
and personally. WWOC grew quickly and in coalition with allies deliv-
ered a number of substantial victories over the four years of organizing.
Organizers state that the most difficult obstacle in the campaign was
the fact that the workfare campaign was the initial ACORN organizing
drive in Los Angeles. The normal model for ACORN organizing is to
build 10-20 affiliates in low-income neighborhoods and engage the
membership in several city-wide campaigns on broader issues such as
utility rates, banking, or predatory lending before tackling an issue like
workfare that has a narrower base and focus. A huge problem in the
workfare campaign was not having the political recognition and power
associated with neighborhood organizing and being labeled as “just an-
other welfare group.” The main reason ACORN evolved 30 years ago
from welfare to neighborhood organizing was precisely the difficulty of
building power from the narrow constituency of welfare recipients and
welfare issues. Organizers felt if they had been in Los Angeles several
years before workfare they would have been able to bring enormously
more pressure to bear on the Board of Supervisors and would have been
more effective sooner than they were.
Organizers stated if they were to do this again they would recom-
mend building strong neighborhood organizations before organizing
around workfare. They also would work harder to win the support of or-
ganized labor earlier in the campaign. Labor got involved in the cam-
paign toward its latter stages, and organizers believed if labor had been
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involved earlier, WWOC/ACORN would have been more effective.
Besides these two points, organizers feel they would not do anything
else differently if they had to do it all over again.
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